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ELECTION OUTCOMES: VOTER ASSESSMENTS OF LIKELY
PARTY SUCCESS IN SCOTLAND’S CONSTITUENCIES
AT THE 2015 AND 2017 GENERAL ELECTIONS
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Abstract
Political scientists often debate how much information people have and deploy
when making electoral decisions. Some scholars suggest that voters are aware
of which party is likely to win in their local constituency at British general
elections; however, this might not be the case in situations when there is
substantial and spatially varying change in the relative fortunes of two or more
parties between elections. That argument is evaluated here using as a case
study the 2015 and 2017 general elections in Scotland: at the ﬁrst, the SNP’s
vote share more than doubled, and it won 56 of the country’s 59 seats, having
won just six at the previous contest; at the second, its vote share fell by about
a third, and it lost 21 of those 56 seats. Analysis of British Election Survey data
collected before and during the campaigns preceding those elections shows
that most respondents were aware of the SNP’s surge in 2015 and expected
their victory in every constituency. In 2017, most voters were aware which of
the SNP’s three competitors was the biggest threat in each constituency, and
that awareness became clearer during the campaign; yet, voters – especially
those who identiﬁed with the SNP and were contacted by it during the
campaign – still (incorrectly) anticipated a local SNP victory.
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An underlying assumption of voting behaviour studies is that the electorate is
composed of rational individuals who make decisions on the basis of
substantial volumes of information gleaned during the campaign (Downs,
1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Merrill and Grofman 1999; Himmelweit
et al., 1981; Rose and McAllister, 1990). Voters process the information in terms
of costs and beneﬁts and then make informed choices – whether to vote at a
general election, for example, and, if so, for which party and/or candidate. Yet,
some scholars argue that voters have neither the time nor the inclination to
assemble and then evaluate large bodies of information; instead, they use
heuristics – such as their opinions of party leaders – as short-cuts to
decision-making (Fiorina, 1981; Sniderman et al., 1991; Clarke et al., 2009;
Green and Jennings, 2017). Even so, voters need some information on which to
operate. This model of decision-making has been strongly criticised by Achen
and Bartels (2016: 277) who stress ‘the sheer magnitude of most people’s
ignorance about politics’. So how much do people really know about their local
electoral situation, and what do they learn during the campaign?
In electoral systems such as that used for general elections in the
United Kingdom two considerations are relevant to most voters. The ﬁrst
concerns the political parties, which seek to get as many MPs as possible
elected so that they can inﬂuence government formation and subsequent
policy development – as a majority government, as members of a coalition or
other inter-party agreement, or as an opposition holding a government
to account. In this context, potential voters evaluate the parties and their
policy proposals – many using heuristics such as their opinions of the party
leaders – on which the national campaigns increasingly focus. At the 2017 UK
General Election, for example, many electors are reported to have told
canvassers that they approved of the Labour party’s policies but could not vote
for it because they believed its leader, Jeremy Corbyn, was not a credible Prime
Minister (Ross and McTague, 2017; Shipman, 2017).
The second consideration concerns the context in their local constituency. At
most UK general elections the outcome in many constituencies is almost certain
long before the votes are canvassed, let alone cast and counted. These safe
seats occur where one of the parties had such a substantial majority over the
others at the previous contest that a change in incumbency is extremely
doubtful save a major shift in public opinion. In such constituencies, some
voters – especially those with little interest in the election outcome and for
Ron Johnston, Charles Pattie and Todd K. Hartman
2
whom voting does not evoke a strong sense of civic duty – may decide not to
bother to vote. In safe seats, even the parties are unlikely to expend valuable
resources to canvass their support (Denver and Hands, 1997). If electors believe
that the seat where they live is marginal, on the other hand, and think that their
vote could make a diﬀerence to the outcome, they are more likely not only to
vote but also to consider the option carefully and come to a reasoned decision
regarding which party/candidate to support (Denver and Hands, 1985; Downs
1957, Pattie and Johnston, 1998). In such situations, too, the parties with a
chance of winning the seat are likely to canvass support there, providing
information regarding the nature of the local contest, on which voters may base
their decisions.
But how accurate is voters’ local knowledge about the situation in their home
constituency? Do they believe that the seat is safe for one of the parties, or do
they think that two (or more) parties have a chance of victory? And do those
beliefs become more accurate as voters are provided with information during
the campaign?
There is a growing literature, originating in the United States (e.g. Lewis-Beck
and Skalahan, 1989), exploring what has become known as ‘citizen forecasting’
that uses survey instruments inquiring which party/candidate respondents
believe will win in their home district/constituency. Graefe (2014) has shown
that citizens provide some of the most accurate estimates in forecasting
American presidential election results, and more recent analyses indicate that
the larger the group surveyed (e.g. aggregated by a US state) or the greater its
members’ ability (e.g. measured by the higher their educational qualiﬁcations),
the better the forecasts (Murr, 2015). Comparable work in Germany has shown
that better forecasts are provided by individuals in large social networks
containing considerable political expertise and which involve substantial
political discussion (Leiter et al., 2018) – although Belgian data suggest that
individuals with partisan attachments are more likely to over-estimate their
party’s chances of success (Stiers and Dassonneville, 2018).
Work on citizen forecasting has also been extended to Great Britain. The
British Election Study (BES) surveys have regularly asked respondents questions
regarding each of the main parties’ chances of success in their local
constituency. In most cases this was a binary question – for example, ‘which
party has the best chance of winning?’ Murr (2011, 2015) has analysed the
responses, concluding that most electors were accurate in their expectations,
and he has used these expectations to forecast the outcome in each seat (see
also Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2011). In some ways this accuracy is
unsurprising, given – as noted above – that most seats at most elections are
considered safe for one of the parties (see Curtice, 2018, on the declining
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number of marginal seats over the last half-century). Of more interest is how
accurate their perceptions are in the marginal constituencies, especially when
there is considerable change in the relative popularity of each party between
elections, and also whether those perceptions change during the campaign.
Using survey data from the BES, we analyse evaluations of each party’s
likelihood of winning at the 2015 and 2017 UK general elections in Scotland’s
59 constituencies to: (1) identify whether voters’ assessments of each party’s
chances of victory in their home constituency reﬂected either (or both) of
its positions at the preceding election and the outcome of the next;
and (2) determine whether those assessments changed during the election
campaign, and whether any such changes were linked to the parties canvassing
of their support. The results allow an overall evaluation of the extent of voter
knowledge of two, substantially changing, electoral situations – could they
accurately predict which party would win in their home constituency? For the
2015 election, the analyses focus on the surge in support for the SNP; for the
2017 election, they address not only the SNP’s decline in support but also
the relative advance of each of the other three parties. These data show that
local voters were generally well aware of the SNP’s prospects in their home
constituencies, especially among those who were more interested in politics,
those who identiﬁed with the party, and those canvassed for support during
the last weeks of the campaign.
Scotland as a case study
Scotland provides an excellent case study to investigate the accuracy of voter
expectations. At previous elections very few of its constituencies were
marginal, but between 2010 and 2015 there was a substantial surge in
support for the Scottish National Party (SNP), followed by a signiﬁcant decline
at the next election only two years later. In 2010, the SNP won 20 per cent of
the votes cast in Scotland and just six of the 59 seats; at the next election in
2015 the SNP’s vote share increased to 50 per cent, and it won all but three of
the seats – even over-turning majorities against it of 40 percentage points or
more in 10 constituencies (all of them won by Labour in 2010) – and by
between 30–40 points in a further 15 constituencies. At the 2017 election the
SNP’s vote share fell to 36.9 per cent, and it lost 21 of the seats won just two
years previously: its share of the votes cast fell by more than 15 percentage
points in 26 of the seats. Alongside these substantial, and spatially varying,
changes in SNP support between 2015 and 2017 were major shifts in support
for the other three parties that contested all 59 seats at each of the elections.
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The Conservative share fell (very slightly) in just one constituency, for example,
and increased by 12 points or more (to a maximum of 29) in half of the seats;
Labour’s decline in mean vote share across the 59 seats was 17.8 percentage
points between 2010 and 2015 (when it was defeated in 40 of the 41 seats won
in 2010): between 2015 and 2017 its vote share declined again in 13 but
increased by over 5 points (to a maximum of 12) in a further 22 constituencies.
The Liberal Democrats also lost support (by as much as 21 points) in 11 seats
between 2015 and 2017. In short, almost every Scottish constituency
experienced substantial changes in support for at least two of the four political
parties at both of those elections.
Building on its seven years as the leading party in the Scottish Parliament
(Mitchell et al., 2011) and mobilisation of a very substantial minority of the
electorate during its campaign for a ‘yes’ vote in the 2014 referendum on
Scottish independence (McCrone, 2017), a surge in support for the SNP was
widely anticipated and much discussed in the media well before the 2015
election (Henderson and Mitchell, 2018). An opinion poll conducted in late
April 2015 by Ipsos/MORI for the STV television channel suggested that the SNP
would win 54 per cent of the votes if an election were held then, for example,
while on the basis of that and other polls one month before the election it was
estimated that the party would return between 38 and 54 of Scotland’s 59 MPs.
On election day (7 May) that estimate was reﬁned to 52: the SNP won 56.1
In April 2017 the Prime Minister called a snap general election, seeking to
enhance the Conservative party’s majority in the House of Commons to bolster
support for her negotiations over the UK’s withdrawal from the European
Union, which had been formally announced a few weeks earlier. In Scotland
much political debate followed that decision to withdraw, which had been
opposed by a majority of voters there. It focused on whether, given Scottish
voters’ desire to retain EU membership, another independence referendum
should be held; the Scottish Parliament voted in favour of this SNP proposal in
March 2017.2 This was strongly opposed by the Conservative, Labour and
Liberal Democrat parties and by a considerable proportion of the Scottish
electorate. As a consequence the SNP’s popularity fell; an initial interpretation
was that the other three parties would split the anti-SNP vote in 2017, allowing
it to retain most of its 2015 gains. But as the campaign proceeded a strong
performance by the Conservatives and their leader, Ruth Davidson, suggested
that they would beneﬁt most from the shift as the party most likely to hold the
line against another independence referendum (Henderson and Mitchell,
2018).
Further, as this Conservative revival became more apparent some potential
Labour or Liberal Democrat supporters may have voted tactically to defeat the
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SNP (as voters might also in seats where the other two parties were seen as the
major contender). A March 2017 opinion poll, conducted before the
unexpected general election was called, indicated that 47 per cent of
respondents would vote for the SNP if there were a general election then,
whereas just before polling day on 7 June another found that support had fallen
to 40 per cent. Estimates of the SNP’s likely tally of seats did not suggest a major
shift, however: three weeks before polling day it was put at 45–54, and on
polling day itself 43–54;3 both vote and seat shares were over-estimated. The
decline in SNP support was spatially variable and beneﬁted diﬀerent parties
across the 59 constituencies. In 2015 the SNP’s advance was largely at Labour’s
expense: Labour won 42 per cent of the votes and 41 seats in 2010 but 24.3 per
cent and just one seat in 2015, making only a small recovery in vote share (to
27.1 per cent) in 2017 but gaining six seats. The main advance in 2017 was by
the Conservatives, whose vote share in 2010 and 2015 was 16.7 and 14.9 per
cent respectively, on each occasion delivering just one Conservative MP; in
2017 their vote share almost doubled to 28.6 per cent, which delivered 13 MPs.
The Liberal Democrats’ vote share declined across the three elections – from
18.8 through 7.5 to 6.8 per cent; they won eleven seats in 2010, one in 2015,
and four in 2017.
This volume of change in Scotland provides a valuable case study of the
extent to which voters were aware of the parties’ changing fortunes. Did they
see the SNP landslide coming in their home constituencies in 2015, and two
years later were they aware not only of the party’s decline but also which seats
it was most likely to lose? Further, did that awareness change during the
campaign?
Measuring local expectations of victory
A new British Election Study (BES) Panel Survey of the British electorate was
established in 2014, and to date 14 waves of data have since been collected.
Respondents to Wave 4 were contacted in March 2015, just before the general
election campaign began, and those who responded to Wave 5 were contacted
(as sub-samples) at some time in March-May 2015, during the campaign.Wave
11 contacted respondents in April-May 2017, before the campaign for the 2017
general election, and sub-samples were then contacted for Wave 12 during the
campaign in May-June. In all of these waves, respondents were asked ‘How
likely do you think … [party x] …will win in your constituency’on a scale ranging
from 0 ‘very unlikely to win’ to 100 ‘very likely to win’. These responses can be
interpreted as percentage odds, with a response of 50 suggesting an equal
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chance of winning or losing (though, of course, we cannot know whether the
respondents interpreted them in this way).
Histograms of the distribution of the evaluations at the 2015 pre-campaign
survey (i.e. Wave 4) suggest that in the aggregate respondents were generally
aware of the four parties’ chances of winning across the 59 constituencies
(Figure 1). The ﬁrst two – the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats – have very
clear modal values of 0; a substantial number of respondents thought neither
party had much chance of success locally. For the Conservatives, this reﬂected
their weak performance in 2010 – when they won only one seat – and the lack
Figure 1:
Frequency distributions of respondents’ assessments of the likelihood of each party
winning in their home constituency in the 2015 pre-campaign survey
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of any subsequent improvement. The Liberal Democrats won eleven Scottish
seats in 2010 but within months of their entering a coalition with the
Conservatives after that election polls showed that their support had declined
by about two-thirds, which suggested that most of the seats would be
unwinnable in 2015 – and the histogram indicates that this was the local
respondents’ clear majority view. For Labour (note that the vertical scale on the
last two histograms diﬀers from that for the ﬁrst two), which won 41 seats in
2010, the tri-modal distribution suggests a repeat; a majority of respondents’
expectations were greater than 50, but the absence of a large number
recording expectations of 75 of more suggests worries that seats might be lost.
The ﬁnal histogram shows considerable expectations of SNP success across
much of the country – reﬂecting what the media were reporting from the
opinion polls.
The respondents’ odds percentages cannot be directly equated with the
actual situation – i.e. a party’s expected margin of victory/defeat as a share of
the votes cast – but a general relationship can be anticipated. Its nature is
assessed here according to two separate sets of expectations. If voters assess a
party’s chances of victory in a constituency according to its performance there
at the previous contest, then there should be a close relationship between the
outcome of that previous election and the odds percentages of victory at the
next. If, on the other hand, voters are aware of changes in the likelihood of a
local victory since the last election, there should be a closer relationship with
the outcome at the forthcoming contest.
Expectations of an SNP victory in 2015
Table 1 addresses those two arguments for the 2015 election. The BES
respondents’ expectations of an SNP victory locally have been amalgamated
into six groups ranging from those where victory is unexpected (0–24), through
those where the odds are close to even (40–49 and 50–59) to those where
victory is considered very likely (75–100); these form the columns in the two
blocks of data. In the ﬁrst of those blocks the rows refer to the local outcome in
2010; in the second they refer to the actual outcome in 2015. In each case, the
margins of victory-or-loss are also placed in six groups, with their borders
reﬂecting the diﬀerent outcomes (the SNP won 6 seats in 2010 and 56 in
2015).4 Thus in the ﬁrst block of data, the ﬁrst row refers to the constituencies
where the SNP lost by 30 points or more in 2010: 12.1 per cent of respondents
there assessed its chances of a local victory as between 0–24, whereas 40.2
assessed them as 75 or greater.
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Each row in the table shows the percentage of respondents in that group of
constituencies giving the expectation of an SNP victory shown in the column
headings (with the total number of respondents shown in the ﬁnal column). If a
likelihood of 50 or greater is taken as an indicator that a party is considered
more likely than not to win in a constituency, then a majority of respondents
across all seats (75.7 per cent), as well as in each group according to the
2010 result (i.e. the various rows), expected an SNP victory in their home
constituency. In general, the percentage of respondents clearly anticipating
an SNP victory (i.e. a value of 75–100) should increase down the six rows for
the column headed 75–100, and this was indeed the case. (There were
no constituencies where the SNP lost by less than 10 percentage points in
Table 1:
Expectations of a local party victory by the result at the previous and next
election in 2015
Expectation of SNP Victory 2015
SNP Margin 2010 0–24 25–39 40–49 50–59 60–75 75–100 N
< −30 12.1 7.5 7.9 11.4 20.8 40.2 945
–29: −20 10.0 7.6 6.3 13.8 20.0 42.3 986
–19: −10 8.3 4.9 8.6 10.2 14.7 53.4 266
0: −9 * * * * * * *
0: +9 7.6 3.1 3.8 4.6 8.4 72.5 131
+10< 6.3 3.8 5.1 6.3 11.4 67.1 79
TOTAL 10.4 6.9 7.0 11.7 18.8 45.2 2,407
Expectation of SNP Victory 2015
SNP Margin 2015 0–24 25–39 40–49 50–59 60–75 75–100 N
< 0 18.2 13.1 8.0 12.4 24.1 24.1 137
0: +4 14.1 10.9 7.6 13.0 18.5 35.9 92
5: +9 8.6 8.1 12.2 13.7 21.3 36.0 197
10: +14 10.3 6.7 7.6 14.1 21.7 39.6 341
15: +19 9.6 6.2 6.0 9.4 18.9 49.8 646
+20< 9.9 5.9 6.2 11.8 16.6 49.6 994
TOTAL 10.4 6.9 7.0 11.7 18.8 45.2 2,407
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2010.) Although the general pattern is as expected – the better the party’s
performance there in 2010 the greater the odds percentage that it would win
locally in 2015 – nevertheless substantial proportions of the respondents still
provided values that were out-of-kilter with the outcome in 2010, let alone
what the polls had been telling them about the increases in support for the SNP
in the months before the general election was called. Of those living in the
seats which the SNP won by a comfortable majority of 10 percentage points or
more in 2010, for example, 15.2 per cent gave an odds percentage less than 50,
implying that they thought the SNP was more likely to lose than win there. Such
low expectations are oddly placed when compared with those of the majority of
respondents living in the constituencies where the SNP performed very badly in
2010 (i.e. lost by more than 30 percentage points to the winning party): 40.2
per cent of them gave the SNP an odds percentage greater than 75 and a
further 20.8 per cent an odds of 60–75. High expectations also characterised
respondents in the marginal seats that the SNP won by less than 10 points in
2010: 72.5 per cent thought victory there very likely in 2015.
Relatively high expectations in the seats lost by the SNP in 2010 could reﬂect
respondents factoring in the known surge in SNP support that the polls and the
media were reporting (and the SNP itself was promoting: Curtice et al., 2015;
Mitchell, 2015; Diﬄey, 2017). This is evaluated in the second block of data in
Table 1 where expectations are correlated with the actual outcome in each
constituency. As in the previous analysis, the general pattern is as expected; the
better the SNP’s performance in 2015 the greater the likelihood that
respondents expected a victory there. Thus, for example, 39.3 per cent of
respondents in the three constituencies where the SNP lost in 2015 gave an
odds percentage of victory there of less than 50, whereas in those that it won
by 20 points or more 77.8 per cent gave an odds percentage greater than
50 – and just under half gave an odds greater than 74. But again, there were
anomalies; in those seats that were won by a wide margin of 20 points or more,
for example, 22.0 per cent of respondents still said a defeat was more likely
than a victory (i.e. an odds percentage less than 50).
Expectations of an SNP victory in 2017
The next general election was held only a little more than two years later in the
same constituencies, so voters should have been well aware in 2017 of the
SNP’s local prospects, whether or not they factored in the polling predictions of
a substantial decline in the party’s share of the national electorate.5 Data from
the BES Wave 11 (i.e. conducted just after the election was called in 2017 and
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before intensive campaigning began – the election was unexpected by all
parties) are analysed in Table 2 and are generally consistent with the expected
pattern.6 A majority of all respondents (56 per cent) said that an SNP victory in
their constituency was very likely – odds of 75 or more – and there was a
plurality with that view in every group of constituencies according to the 2017
outcome, although, as before, the better the outcome for the SNP the larger
the percentage of local respondents who anticipated the party’s victory there.
(Only 30.7 per cent returned odds of 75 or more in the seats where the SNP lost
by over 20 points in 2017, for example, as against 63.6 per cent in those where
the SNP candidate won by 10 or more percentage points.)
Figure 2 reﬂects those continued high expectations regarding the SNP’s
fortunes leading up to the 2017 contest and the relatively bleak expectations of
Table 2:
Expectations of a local party victory by the result at the previous and next
election in 2017
Expectation of SNP Victory 2017
SNP Margin 2015 0–24 25–39 40–49 50–59 60–75 75–100 N
< 0 19.5 11.4 16.3 14.6 17.1 21.1 123
0: +4 11.2 6.7 10.1 14.6 20.2 37.1 89
5: +9 8.8 4.4 5.9 14.7 20.6 45.6 204
10: +14 9.7 4.4 6.3 7.5 18.1 54.1 320
15: +19 9.8 2.8 4.7 4.4 19.0 59.3 642
+20< 9.0 4.2 4.8 5.3 16.0 60.6 995
TOTAL 9.9 4.3 5.9 7.0 17.7 55.2 2,373
Expectation of SNP Victory 2017
SNP Margin 2017 0–24 25–39 40–49 50–59 60–75 75–100 N
< −20 9.9 8.9 13.9 17.8 18.8 30.7 101
−19: −10 11.8 4.6 7.8 12.4 22.2 41.2 153
−9: 0 8.7 4.0 5.5 7.0 19.4 55.3 1,291
0: +4 10.6 3.9 4.2 6.0 17.5 57.8 566
+5: +9 8.1 3.4 4.2 4.9 16.6 62.8 471
+10 < 8.6 4.3 4.8 4.8 13.9 63.6 209
TOTAL 9.2 4.1 5.4 7.0 18.3 56.0 2,791
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local success for the other three parties, for each of which the clear modal
odds percentage was zero and very few returned a likelihood of 75 or greater.
To the extent that one or more of them was expected to experience a
resurgence of support, the distributions suggest that Labour was believed
more likely to than the Conservatives (on the campaigns in Scotland see
Shipman, 2017, Chapter 23). As a consequence, the SNP’s hegemony was
considered likely to continue, with a modal odds percentage in the 70s
and relatively few respondents giving an expectation for a local victory of
less than 50.
Figure 2:
Frequency distributions of the respondents’ assessments of the likelihood of each
party winning in their home constituency in the 2017 pre-campaign survey
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The ﬁrst block in Table 2 cross-tabulates those pre-campaign (Wave 11)
expectations of a local victory against the respondents’ constituency outcomes
in 2015. Those living in the seats the SNP won then by a margin of 20 points
or more were most likely to express high expectations about another victory
there, although only 60.6 per cent reported odds of over 74 and 18.0 per cent
thought defeat more likely than victory (i.e. odds of less than 50). By contrast,
in the three seats the SNP failed to win in 2015 nearly half of the 123
respondents thought defeat again more likely than victory – although over
one-ﬁfth (21.1 per cent) thought a victory highly likely.Was the general pattern
a reﬂection of what happened? The ﬁnal block in Table 2 cross-tabulates
the Wave 11 expectations against the 2017 election outcome and shows even
more anomalous results than at the previous contest. In the seats where
the SNP lost by more than 20 points, a majority of the 101 respondents
(67.3 per cent) thought a victory more likely than a defeat and only 9.9 per cent
thought defeat very likely. Indeed, whatever the outcome – the SNP won in
35 seats and lost in 24 – a majority of respondents thought that a victory was
much more likely than defeat (i.e. an expectation of victory less than 50).
These ﬁrst descriptive analyses have indicated that although in general
respondents were reasonably aware of the likely outcome for the SNP in their
local constituency before the campaign started for each of the two elections,
nevertheless there were many whose expectations were considerably out of
line with both that general pattern and the actual outcome. (It was the same
with voters who supported the other three parties, but those data have not
been presented here.) Did the campaigns change that? Were some groups of
voters (those most interested in elections, for example) more accurate in their
expectations than others? And were certain types of voter – e.g. those who
identify with a party – more likely to assess its likely performance accurately
than others? (Taber and Lodge – 2006: 767 – for example, conclude that
‘people are often unable to escape the pull of their prior attitudes and beliefs,
which guide the processing of new information in predictable … ways’.)
Campaign Impacts?
To answer those questions we suggest that: (1) those interested in the election
would be more accurate in their estimates than those who were not; (2) those
who identiﬁed with the party would have higher expectations in their estimates
than those who did not; and (3) those who had been contacted by the party in
the preceding four weeks (this is the question asked in the BES surveys) would
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have higher expectations than those who were not – on the argument that if a
party contacts you that probably means it thinks it has a chance of victory there.
Foreseeing the 2015 surge?
In this ﬁrst evaluation we selected respondents living in the six constituencies
that the SNP won in 2010 (i.e. the lowest row in the ﬁrst block of Table 1)
and contrasted those who evaluated the party’s chances of victory in 2015 as
less than 50 with those who gave an odds percentage of 75 or more. On all
three comparisons, the expected diﬀerences emerged. Only 29.8 per cent of
respondents who gave the odds of an SNP victory as 50 or less said that they
were ‘very interested’ in the election, for example, compared to 60.8 per cent
who gave odds of 75 or greater; the interested were better informed. Of
those who gave odds of 50 or less, only 9.7 per cent identiﬁed with the SNP,
compared with 39.9 per cent of those who expected another SNP victory
there (odds of 75 or more); and only 9.7 per cent of those who gave odds of
50 or less had been contacted by the SNP in the weeks leading up to the survey,
compared to 25.7 per cent of those who gave odds of 75 or more. Just before
the 2015 campaign began, therefore, among respondents living in an SNP-held
constituency those interested in the election, those who identiﬁed with the
party and those who had been contacted by it were more certain about its
chances of winning again in 2015 whereas the disinterested, those who didn’t
identify with the SNP, and those who hadn’t been contacted were either
less so – or wrong!
Did things change during the 2015 campaign? Among thosewho gave odds of
75 or more of an SNP victory in 2015 in the seats it won in 2010, unsurprisingly
very few changed their position markedly. Just under half gave a higher score in
the campaign (Wave 5) than in the pre-campaign (Wave 4) survey; of those who
reduced the SNP’s odds of a second victory, few changed their estimate by more
than 10 points. For them, nothing substantial changed during the campaign.
Change was much more substantial among those living in SNP-held seats who
before the campaign started gave the party a less than evens chance of victory
again – with one respondent changing the odds from 0 to 100. Respondents
were questioned again immediately after the election (i.e. in Wave 6) and asked
if they had been contacted by the parties during the campaign’s last four weeks.
Almost all of those who reported contact with the SNP increased their
assessment of the SNP’s chances between Waves 4 and 5, in most cases
increasing the odds from less than to more than 50; canvassing their support led
to people increasing their expectations of the party winning.
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These data suggest that those who are disinterested in an election, do not
identify with a speciﬁed party, and are not contacted by it are least likely to be
relatively accurate in their estimates of its chances of local success in seats
where the party ‘objectively’ should have performed well. But what of seats
where success should have been unexpected – those that the SNP lost by more
than 30 percentage points in 2010 (the top row in the ﬁrst block of data in
Table 1)? These are the 26 seats that the SNP was least likely to win but, given
the surge in its support, it achieved victory in all but one. As the ﬁrst block
of data in Table 1 shows, 71.4 per cent of respondents there gave it a more
than evens chance of victory before the campaign began and we expected that
these would be the people more interested in the election, those who
identiﬁed with the SNP, and those contacted by it. All three expectations were
conﬁrmed: of those who gave the SNP a victory expectation of 75 points
or more, 72.9 were very interested in the election, compared with 56.5 per cent
of those who gave odds of 50 or less; similarly, of those in the ﬁrst category,
38.2 per cent identiﬁed with the SNP compared to 17.3 per cent of those in the
second category; and 33.0 per cent of those who gave the SNP a less than evens
chance of a local victory had been contacted by the party in the previous four
weeks compared to 61.4 per cent of those who gave the SNP an odds-on chance
of winning. Of those who gave the SNP odds of a local victory of less than
50 before the campaign, four-ﬁfths increased those odds by the time they were
questioned during the campaign. Among those reporting that they were
contacted during the campaign (i.e. during Wave 5) their odds of an SNP victory
locally increased by an average of 32.8 points, compared to 14.8 for those who
were not. Again, it appears that the information provided to people when they
were canvassed by the party led to them increasing their expectations that it
would win locally.
Anticipating the 2017 SNP decline?
The SNP’s surge in 2015 was followed by a substantial fall in support two years
later. At most UK elections, a party which won a constituency by between
10 and 20 percentage points at one contest could expect to hold it again at the
next. The SNP won 22 seats by such a margin in 2015, but lost in 10 of them two
years later; what were the expectations there? The ﬁnal row in the ﬁrst block in
Table 2 shows that the great majority of respondents expected an SNP victory
again; over half gave an odds of 75 or more. Among them, over 64.6 per cent
said they were very interested in the election as against 51.1 per cent of those
who gave the odds of a further SNP victory in their constituency as less than 50;
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and 35.9 per cent of the group who thought another SNP victory very likely
identiﬁed with the SNP, more than twice the 16.5 per cent of those who gave
odds of less than 50 – further suggesting that at least some of those with high
expectations of a further SNP victory locally were motivated by their strong
partisanship for the party. Regarding contact, at the start of the campaign of
those who had been contacted by any of the parties among those giving odds
of 75 or more 38.3 per cent had been contacted by the SNP in the previous
four weeks, whereas 27.4 per cent had been contacted by the Conservatives,
22.7 per cent by Labour and 14.4 by the Liberal Democrats; among those who
gave odds of 50 or less the respective percentages were 26.1, 22,7, 21.0 and
11.4. Those who saw defeat as likely had more contact from the other parties
relative to the SNP. Similar diﬀerences were reported after the election, when
again respondents were asked about contact in the preceding four weeks.
Among those expecting another SNP win in their constituency, 60.6 per cent
had been contacted by the SNP, 42.4 per cent by the Conservatives,
38.8 per cent by Labour and 28.5 per cent by the Liberal Democrats. The
corresponding percentages among those with low expectations of an SNP
victory were 36.9, 34.7, 31.3 and 21.6.
These data show that, with regard to the SNP’s local performances in both
2015 and 2017, local voters were in general well aware of the party’s prospects
in their home constituencies. Where the party had performed well at the
previous election, they were more likely to rate its chances of victory higher
than were those living in constituencies where it performed less well. Further,
changes in SNP support between the contests also inﬂuenced the evaluations;
some voters, at least, were tracking the party’s prospects and adjusting their
evaluations of the outcome accordingly. But there were considerable variations
in those assessments. Those who were more interested in politics were
more likely to be ‘accurate’ in their evaluations of the likely local outcome
than those who were less interested – as were those who identiﬁed with the
party compared with those who did not. Furthermore, the SNP’s canvassing
for support during the last weeks of the campaign inﬂuenced how voters
responded to the party’s local prospects; those contacted appeared to assume
that the SNP had a good chance of winning locally and adjusted their estimates
of that occurring accordingly.
Inter-party competition
In making their estimates of each party’s chances of victory in their home
constituency, respondents were not necessarily playing a zero-sum game so
Ron Johnston, Charles Pattie and Todd K. Hartman
16
that, for example, if they estimated the SNP’s chances there as 70, then the
sum of their estimates for the other three parties could not exceed 30. They
might express their uncertainty by giving more than one party a chance of
victory exceeding 50. Two examples illustrate this. In the ﬁrst (Figure 3[a]) the
mean expectation of an SNP victory for each of the 59 constituencies in the
2015 pre-campaign survey is graphed against the comparable mean for a
Labour victory. Labour won 41 seats at the previous contest in 2010, and in all
of those constituencies respondents gave them a more than evens chance of
victory again, compared to much lower odds in the 18 where they lost in 2010.
Expectations were higher where the party traditionally performed well. But in
all of the Labour-held seats respondents also gave the SNP a more-than-evens
chance of victory – in most of them averaging around 65. Expectations of an
SNP victory were generally greatest where Labour lost in 2010; elsewhere,
voters were, in eﬀect, undecided whether either Labour would win again or the
seat would be lost in the SNP surge. Very little changed during the campaign:
Figure 3[b] shows, using the Wave 5 campaign data, that, in general, in the seats
Labour won in 2010 mean expectations for both a Labour and an SNP victory in
2015 increased slightly.
The second example is for the contest between the SNP and the
Conservatives in 2017. Before the campaign began the mean expectation
Figure 3:
Mean expectations of SNP and Labour wins in constituencies at the 2015 election
in the (a) pre-campaign and (b) campaign surveys
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was of an SNP victory (i.e. odds of 50 or greater) in all but two of the
constituencies – those won by the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats
respectively in 2015 (Figure 4[a]). There were four where the odds of a
Conservative victory were placed above 50 on average, alongside an average
of 60 or more for an SNP victory there; all those seats were won by the
Conservatives in 2017, as were three others where the odds were assessed as
just below 50. In general, voters were aware of where the Conservatives were
most likely to displace the SNP. This became even clearer during the campaign
(Figure 4[b]) when odds greater than 50 were assessed for all but one of the
seats that the Conservatives eventually won – and there were only two
constituencies where the SNP won despite odds of a Conservative win
exceeding 50. (There were also approximately even chances of a Conservative
victory in seats won by the Liberal Democrats.)
In both examples, therefore, although before the campaign began
respondents gave relatively high assessments of the chances of the previous
victor winning again (Labour in 2015 and SNP in 2017) they also were able to
identify the likely alternative winner. Further, in both cases the likely outcome
was clariﬁed during the campaign. Similar situations occurred with regard to
the seats won from the SNP by Labour and the Liberal Democrats in 2017,
especially the latter; Labour’s victories then were more unexpected.
Figure 4:
Mean Expectations of SNP and Conservative wins in constituencies at the 2017
election in the (a) pre-campaign and (b) campaign surveys
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Predicting campaign eﬀects
According to these arguments, survey respondents might re-assess the odds
of a party winning in their constituency during an election campaign as a
consequence of the general campaign mood, as expressed through the media
(drawing considerably on opinion polls), and the intensity of local canvassing.
Much research has shown that voters contacted by a party during British
general election campaigns are more likely to turn out and vote for it (although
there is an endogeneity eﬀect – those contacted are likely to be the party’s
supporters: Johnston et al., 2012; Pattie et al., 2015). Here we argue that
those contacted by a party are more likely to consider it likely to win in their
constituency than those not contacted – contact indicating that a party has
reasonable expectations of a local victory (parties rarely expend much time,
money and other resources canvassing support in seats they know they are
going to lose: Johnston and Pattie, 2014).
To test this argument, we conducted separate regression analyses of
respondents’ expectations of each party winning in their local constituency
in 2017 – when the outcome across the constituencies was more variable than
in 2015 – in both the pre-campaign and campaign surveys. Those expectations
are the dependent variables; the key independents are whether they were
contacted during the previous four weeks by each of the four parties and which
party was the eventual local winner. Two other variables are included as
controls. The ﬁrst is the party’s margin of victory/defeat at the 2015 election,
calculated as the diﬀerence in percentage share of the votes cast between
it and the second-placed party if it won there in 2015 and between it
and the winning party if it lost (i.e. a negative value if the party lost there
in 2015 and a positive value if it won). The second is whether the respondent
identiﬁed with the party. (We also explored whether interest in the election
was linked to the evaluations, but the lack of any signiﬁcant relationships
in an initial exploration suggested this was not the case so that variable was
excluded.) Contact was determined by answers to questions regarding whether
respondents had been contacted during the previous four weeks by any of the
parties, and if so which. Finally, we included a variable indicating whether the
party won in the constituency in 2017, exploring whether respondents were
on average suﬃciently aware of the likely victor in their home constituency to
give it greater odds of success there.
The regression results are all in line with expectations (Table 3), although
the low R2 values (not unusual for analyses of such survey data) suggest




Regressions of expectations of each party winning the local constituency in the
pre-campaign and campaign surveys before the 2017 election (coeﬃcients signiﬁcant
at the 0.05 level or better are shown in bold)
Con Lab LD SNP
Pre-Campaign
Constant 52.18 48.47 45.23 56.50
Margin2015 0.59 0.52 0.57 0.38
Identiﬁer 15.58 11.76 11.73 10.66
Contacted by
Conservative 2.99 –3.26 –2.48 1.65
Labour –1.81 5.05 –0.22 –2.53
Liberal Democrat 2.59 –3.46 6.68 1.48
SNP –1.33 –1.85 –1.14 3.22
Party Won in 2017 4.91 7.71 8.49 2.85
R2 0.18 0.14 0.26 0.07
Campaign
Constant 56.73 51.40 44.67 58.86
Margin2015 0.46 0.52 0.57 0.20
Identiﬁer 12.13 12.39 7.81 11.51
Contacted by
Conservative 5.57 –3.59 –2.99 –1.06
Labour –0.97 7.86 –0.96 –0.03
Liberal Democrat –2.63 –0.92 7.59 –0.58
SNP –4.85 –4.67 –1.13 5.84
Party Won in 2017 9.19 4.65 12.70 2.63
R2 0.16 0.13 0.28 0.06
Campaign (Post-Campaign Contact)
Constant 57.02 52.09 45.52 56.62
Margin2015 0.45 0.51 0.58 0.23
Identiﬁer 12.08 11.89 8.12 11.42
Continued
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scale for the dependent variable, which calls for a degree of precision that
few respondents were able to deploy.7
The ﬁrst block of regressions in Table 3 relates to the 2017 pre-campaign
(Wave 11) survey. All four variables representing the relevant party’s margin
of victory/defeat in 2015 are both positive and statistically signiﬁcant: as
expected, the better a party’s performance in 2015 the greater the average
expectation of its victory in 2017. The coeﬃcients for whether the respondent
identiﬁed with the relevant party are also all statistically signiﬁcant and
relatively large, averaging some 12.5 points on the 0–100 scale, indicating that
voters who identify with a party are on average more optimistic about
its prospects than those who do not. (There is potential endogeneity here;
people may be more likely to identify with a party in places where it is more
likely to win. Or it might – as in the Belgian study (Stiers and Dassonneville,
2018) – reﬂect ‘wishful thinking’ by a party’s committed supporters.)
Turning to the contact variables, a respondent who had been contacted
by any of the parties during the previous four weeks was more likely to assess
that party’s chances of a local victory by as many as several points higher than
those not contacted. Each of the three parties contesting seats currently held
by the SNP had its chances of a local victory rated higher if respondents there
had been contacted by the relevant party than if they had not; in addition,
those contacted by the Conservatives on average rated both Labour’s and the
Liberal Democrats’ local chances lower than did those ignored by Conservative
canvassers. Contact from the SNP signiﬁcantly increased the assessed likelihood
of its success but did not signiﬁcantly lower its opponents’ perceived chances.
Finally in this ﬁrst block of regressions, the four coeﬃcients for whether the
relevant party won in 2017 are all both positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
In general, therefore, respondents were aware of which seats each party was
Table 3: Continued
Con Lab LD SNP
Contacted by
Conservative 6.68 –4.75 –3.06 –1.61
Labour –2.71 7.48 0.97 –1.06
Liberal Democrat –2.48 –3.73 4.86 1.14
SNP –4.54 –3.30 –2.21 7.86
Party Won in 2017 9.12 4.98 13.39 2.87
R2 0.16 0.13 0.28 0.06
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more likely to win, rating their chances more highly there than in those where
they were destined to lose – though this was of course not known at the time.
The largest of those coeﬃcients were for Labour and the Liberal Democrats,
suggesting that respondents were clearer at the start of the campaign where
their prospects were greater than they were for either the Conservatives or the
SNP. (Five of the constituencies where the Conservatives came second to the
SNP in 2017 were won by the latter with majorities of 5 percentage points or
less, making estimates of which party would win there very diﬃcult. Similarly,
the SNP lost by 5 points or less in seven constituencies then and won in 15
by less than that margin – indeed, by less than one percentage point in 8.
Predicting such outcomes accurately would be very diﬃcult for voters, however
well-informed.)
The second set of regressions in Table 3 uses the data on expectations
and contact provided during the campaign itself, with very similar results
to those for the pre-campaign situation. Of particular interest is the increased
size of the coeﬃcients for the ﬁnal variable for both the Conservatives
and Liberal Democrats. This suggests that as the campaign proceeded
local residents became clearer which seats they would win – in the case
of the Liberal Democrats giving an average evaluation 12.7 points larger on
the 0–100 scale in the four seats that the party eventually won than in those
that it lost. Respondents were less sure which seats Labour and the
SNP would win, however: those coeﬃcients were substantially lower
(4.65 and 2.73 respectively) than those for the Conservative (9.19) and
Liberal Democrat (12.70) parties.
One diﬃculty with analysis of the campaign data is that some respondents
were interviewed early in the ﬁve-week period and others much later; the latter
were probably more likely to have been inﬂuenced by the campaign than
the former. To assess whether this was the case we conducted regressions with
the timing of their interview included as a further variable, which was also
interacted with the contact variables: no statistically signiﬁcant or substantial
ﬁndings emerged (these results are not reported here). We also conducted
further regressions using the responses to the contact questions asked in the
post-election survey (Wave 13), which refer to the last four weeks of the
campaign. These are reported in the ﬁnal block of Table 3, with very similar
ﬁndings to those in the second block; contact had an impact and local
respondents were better able to identify the seats that the Conservatives and
Liberal Democrats were going to gain than either those which Labour would
win or the SNP would retain.
The ﬁnding in all of those regressions that on average respondents assessed a
party’s chances of winning in 2017 as higher in those constituencies where
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it was eventually successful than in those where it was not suggests reasonable
appreciation of the geography of change across constituencies at an election
where that change was both considerable and spatially variable both between
and within parties. The extent to which this occurred is illustrated in a further
series of graphs.
Figure 5[a] shows the mean pre-campaign survey expectation of a 2017
Labour victory in each of the 59 constituencies according to its performance
there in 2015. Labour won only one seat in 2015 and seven seats in 2017.
The mean expectation of success in the one already held was high, at just under
70. Two of the six that it eventually won also had mean expectations greater
than 50; for two more they were just below 50; and for the remaining two
it was slightly less. There were, however, many others where the expectation
of a Labour victory was assessed at 40 or greater but which the SNP won;
on the other hand, the mean expectation of a Labour victory was below 40 in
all of the seats won by the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. Relatively
little changed during the campaign, as shown in Figure 5[b]. Expectations
remained at 40 or greater in all six seats that Labour won; its chances there
were considered much greater than those of either the Conservatives or the
Liberal Democrats but those seats could not be distinguished clearly from the
ones where it lost to the SNP again.
Figure 5:
Mean expectations of a Labour constituency victory, graphed against its margin of
victory/defeat in 2015, in the (a) pre-campaign and (b) campaign 2017 surveys
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Respondents were even clearer in identifying many of the seats where
the Conservatives won in 2017. The party eventually won in all ﬁve seats where
the pre-campaign expectations of a Conservative win exceeded 50, and it won a
further three where the expectations were just below that level (Figure 6[a]).
Further, in very few cases was there a relatively high (above c.40) expectation of
a Conservative victory in seats that the SNP won again, but the Conservatives
were given relatively high expectations in seats eventually won by the Liberal
Democrats. (Much of the media discussion then and during the campaign was
about the surge in support for the Conservatives, with much less about the
Liberal Democrats’ revival in a few seats.) During the campaign, respondents
became even clearer regarding the seats that the Conservatives were going
to win (Figure 6[b]). The mean expectation of a Conservative success exceeded
50 in all but one of the thirteen seats eventually won, and a similar mean
expectation characterised just two of the seats retained by the SNP.
Local residents were even clearer regarding the likelihood of a Liberal
Democrat victory before the campaign began. They were clearly expected
to hold on to the single seat won in 2015 and there were relatively high
expectations of a win in a small number of others, including the three that the
party eventually gained from the SNP (Figure 7[a]); expectations in almost all of
the other seats were very low. This pattern was clariﬁed during the campaign
Figure 6:
Mean expectations of a Conservative constituency victory, graphed against its margin
of victory/defeat in 2015, in the (a) pre-campaign and (b) campaign 2017 surveys
Ron Johnston, Charles Pattie and Todd K. Hartman
24
(Figure 7[b]); there was just one seat where the expectation of a Liberal
Democrat victory exceeded 50 but it was retained by the SNP.
Finally, before the campaign started in 2017 expectations of an SNP victory
were high in almost all seats, exceeding 50 in all but two – those won by the
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats respectively in 2015 (Figure 8[a]).
There was a clear appreciation that the SNP was quite likely to lose in those
seats won in 2015 by a margin of 10 points or less, however, and two of the
seats lost to Labour also had relatively low expectations of an SNP victory.
But across the large majority of the seats won by the SNP in 2015 by a margin
of 10–20 points there was no clear distinction between those that it won
again and those that would be lost to one of the three competitors. Little
changed during the campaign; expectations of an SNP victory remained around
70 points in many of the seats lost to either of the Conservatives or Labour
(Figure 8[b]) – only in the four seats won by the Liberal Democrats were the
expectations of an SNP victory relatively low, though still above 60.
Further exploration of these data again show that the respondents were not
playing zero-sum games – for most the sum of their expectations across all four
parties exceeded 100. This is illustrated in Figure 9[a], which plots the mean
expectation of an SNP victory in each constituency in the 2017 campaign
wave against the mean for a Conservative victory. In all 59 cases the mean
Figure 7:
Mean expectations of a Liberal Democrat constituency victory, graphed against
its margin of victory/defeat in 2015, in the (a) pre-campaign and




Mean expectations of an SNP constituency victory, graphed against its margin of
victory/defeat in 2015, in the (a) pre-campaign and (b) campaign 2017 surveys
Figure 9:
Mean expectations of (a) a Conservative constituency victory and
(b) a Labour constituency victory against the mean expectation of an SNP
constituency victory in the 2017 campaign survey
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expectation of an SNP victory exceeds 50, as it also does for the Conservatives
in 12 of the 13 seats that they won. Local residents believed that another
SNP victory was likely in those seats, therefore, but also that the Conservatives
had a reasonable chance of winning there – better than in almost all of the
other constituencies, where the respondents gave the Conservatives a
likelihood of victory of less than 50. (Such uncertainty was understandable:
the SNP won 17 of its 35 seats in 2017 with less than 40 per cent of the votes,
and eight of them by a majority of less than one percentage point: Johnston
et al., 2017.) Further, there were only four seats (three won by the SNP and one
by the Liberal Democrats) where the mean expectation of a Conservative
victory exceeded 50, but the seat was not won.
In eﬀect, therefore, respondents were ‘hedging their bets’. Those living
in the seats that the Conservatives won in 2017 were more likely to assess
that party’s chances of a local victory there higher than were respondents
in other constituencies; they were aware of the geography of the surge of
support for the Conservatives but they still thought another SNP victory quite
likely – giving it a mean expectation of more than 55 in each case and more
than 60 in most. Local respondents also assessed the Liberal Democrats’
chances of a local victory higher in the four seats that it won than in almost all
others, but in three of the four cases also gave a mean expectation greater than
60 for an SNP victory. But there was much less clarity locally with regard to the
seven seats that Labour won (Figure 9[b]). The Conservative and Liberal
Democrats victories were much more anticipated locally than were Labour’s.
Conclusions
Our analyses largely conﬁrm the ﬁndings of the emerging literature on ‘citizen
forecasting’. Citizens’ predictions of the likely outcomes of elections in their
constituencies are generally accurate, though some are more accurate in their
predictions than others. But we take the argument further by considering
the inﬂuence of both the local electoral context and parties’ own campaign
activities on the accuracy of voters’ predictions. Both prove important parts of
the overall picture.
It is not surprising that most British voters can accurately predict which party
will win in their home constituency at a forthcoming general election since the
great majority of constituencies are safe for one of the parties which is unlikely
to have to yield its incumbency there. But when the outcome is uncertain
because of substantial changes in the electoral fortunes of one or more parties
then local residents may be less clear on the likely outcome. In this paper, we
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have explored residents’ evaluations of each of four parties’ likelihood of
winning in their home constituencies at the 2015 and 2017 General Elections in
Scotland, both of which were characterised by very substantial changes
between contests in two or more parties’ shares of the votes cast and number
of seats won. At the 2015 election, the SNP’s share of the votes more than
doubled from the previous contest, and its number of seats increased more
than eight-fold. That surge was widely forecast in the media before and during
the campaign, and most BES respondents were clearly aware of it.
Two years later, the SNP’s vote share was reduced by almost one-third
overall, but by much more in some constituencies than others. Again, the
likelihood of this shift was widely appreciated by the media both before and
increasingly during the campaign, but respondents were less clear whether it
would have an impact in their home constituency; they thought a further SNP
victory there more likely than not. The beneﬁciary of the decline in SNP support
varied across constituencies, with each of its three competitors winning
some seats. In general, respondents were aware which of those parties was
more likely to be the major beneﬁciary locally, and that awareness was clariﬁed
during the campaign, although the local advances made by the Conservative
and Liberal Democrat parties were more clearly appreciated than were those
of the Labour party – and they were also less certain in which seats the SNP
would perform relatively badly. Contacts from the parties’ canvassers were
instrumental in that clariﬁcation: respondents contacted by a party during the
campaign on average rated its chances of success in a constituency as greater
than did those not contacted – and in addition those who identiﬁed with
a party on average rated its chances of success locally higher than those
who did not.
In general, therefore, Scottish voters were certainly not unaware of both
the national and local trends in party support at those two contests when party
vote shares and occupancy of parliamentary seats changed very substantially.
But where the extent of the change locally was uncertain – which was the case
in 2017 much more than in 2015 – that was reﬂected in their expectations;
they tended to ‘hedge their bets’ in 2017, in most cases by giving relatively
high expectations of a further SNP victory but also expectations greater
than evens of victory by the opposition party considered most likely to win
there. On average, they were aware of the general trends but not – and
probably unsurprisingly so given the ﬁnal outcome in many constituencies – of
their particular trajectory in individual constituencies. But the analyses show
considerable variability around such averages with some voters, especially
those not interested in the election, those who do not identify with a party, and
those whose support was not canvassed during the campaign less likely
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to provide relatively accurate estimates of each party’s local performance. Even
where there was considerable change in the local electoral situation, therefore,
these analyses have provided largely positive answers to the questions posed:
voters were generally aware of which parties had the best chances of success
locally, an awareness that was crystallised during the campaign as more
information was provided on which they based their evaluations, but given
the closeness of the outcome in a substantial number of seats that many
voters predicted the wrong winner is unsurprising. Nevertheless, the more
information they were provided by the parties that canvassed their support
the more likely it was that voters would, correctly, expect it to win locally:
information mattered in that electoral decision-making.
Notes




3. The opinion poll data were obtained from the same source as those for 2015; the
estimated seat tallies came from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom_
general_election,_2017.
4. Given the non-normal distributions shown in Figure 1, summary statistics were not
viable as indicators of variations.
5. Several forecasters published estimates of the outcome in every constituency on the
web, but the number of voters who either accessed these data or had their attention
drawn to them by either the media or the political parties is unknown. In any case, as
with the polls discussed above, all three over-estimated the number of seats the SNP
would win – 47, 51 and 51 respectively (Johnston et al, 2018).
6. The diﬀerent Ns in the two parts of this table reﬂect diﬀerences in the number of
missing observations for the relevant variables.
7. In general, the higher the degree of measurement error in a variable the larger the
standard errors of estimates and hence the smaller the likelihood of ﬁnding a
signiﬁcant relationship (see Blackwell et al., 2017).
References
Achen, C. H. and L. M. Bartels. (2016). Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not
Produce Responsive Government. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Blackwell, M., Honaker, J. and King, G. (2017) ‘A Uniﬁed Approach to Measurement Error




Clarke, H. D., D. Sanders, M. C. Stewart and P. F. Whiteley. (2009). Performance Politics
and the British Voter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Curtice, J. (2018). ‘How the Electoral System Failed to Deliver – Again’. In J. Tonge,
C. Leeston-Bandeira and S. Wilks-Heeg (eds.) Britain Votes 2017. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 29–45.
Curtice, J., S. D. Fisher and R. Ford. (2015). ‘Appendix I: the Results Analysed’. In P. Cowley
and D. Kavanagh, The British General Election of 2015. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 412–451.
Denver, D and G. Hands. (1985). ‘Turnout and Marginality in General Elections in the
1970s’. British Journal of Political Science 15 (4): 318–388.
Denver, D and G. Hands. (1997).Modern Constituency Campaigning: Local Campaigning
in the 1992 General Election. London: Frank Cass.
Diﬄey, M. (2017). ‘The Election in Scotland’. In Political Communication in
Britain: Polling, Campaigning and Media in the 2015 General Election, edited
by D. Wring, R. Mortimore and S. Atkinson. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
49–62.
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper Collins.
Fiorina, M. P. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press.
Graefe. A. (2014). ‘Accuracy of Vote Expectation Surveys in Forecasting Elections’.
Public Opinion Quarterly, 78 (SI): 204–232.
Green, J and W. Jennings. (2017). The Politics of Competence: Parties, Public Opinion
and Voters. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Henderson, A. and Mitchell, J. (2018) ‘Referendums as Critical Junctures? Scottish Voting
in British Elections’. In J. Tonge, C. Leeston-Bandeira and S. Wilks-Heeg (eds.)
Britain Votes 2017. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 109–124.
Himmelweit, H. T., P. Humphreys and M. Jaeger. (1981). How Voters Decide.
Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
Johnston, R. J., D. J. Cutts, C. J. Pattie and J. Fisher. (2012). ‘We’ve Got Them on the
List: Contacting, Canvassing and Voting in a British General Election Campaign’.
Electoral Studies 31 (4): 317–329.
Johnston, R. J. and Pattie, C. J. (2014). Money and Electoral Politics. Local Parties and
Funding in General Elections. Bristol: The Policy Press.
Johnston, R. J., C. J. Pattie, T. Hartman, D. Manley, D. J. Rossiter and K. Jones
(2017). ‘Scotland’s Electoral Geography Diﬀered from the Rest of Britain’s in
2017 (and 2015) – Exploring its Contours’. Scottish Geographical Journal, 134 (1):
24–38.
Johnston, R. J. et al. (2018). ‘Are We Going to Win That Seat? An Exploration of
Constituency-Level Estimates at the 2017 British General Election’. International
Journal of Market Research, 60 (3): 463–483.
Leiter, D., Murr, A., Ramirez, E. R. and Stegmaier, M. (2018). ‘Social Networks and
Citizen Election Forecasting: the More Friends the Better’. International Journal
of Forecasting, 34 (3): 235–248.
Ron Johnston, Charles Pattie and Todd K. Hartman
30
Lewis-Beck, M. S. and Skalaban, A. (1989). ‘Citizen Forecasting: Can Voters See Into the
Future?’ British Journal of Political Science, 36 (3): 617–634.
Lewis-Beck, M. S. and M. Stegmaier. (2011). ‘Citizen Forecasting: Can UK Voters See the
Future?’ Electoral Studies 30 (4): 264–268.
McCrone, D. (2017). ‘Explaining Brexit North and South of the Border’ Scottish Aﬀairs
26 (4), 391–410.
Merrill, S. and B. Grofman. (1999). A Uniﬁed Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity
Spatial Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mitchell, J. (2015). ‘Sea Change in Scotland’. In Britain Votes 2015, edited by A. Geddes
and J. Tonge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 88–100.
Mitchell, J., L. Bennie and R. Johns. (2011). The Scottish National Party: Transition to
Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Murr, A. E. (2011). ‘‘Wisdom of Crowds’? A Decentralised Election Forecasting Model
that Uses Citizens’ Local Expectations’. Electoral Studies 30 (8): 771–783.
Murr, A. E. (2015) The Wisdom Of Crowds: Applying Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to
Forecasting US Presidential Elections’. International Journal of Forecasting, 31 (4):
916–929.
Murr, A. E. (2016). ‘The Wisdom of Crowds; What Do Citizens Forecast for the 2015
British General Election?’ Electoral Studies 41 (4): 283–288.
Pattie, C. J. and R. J. Johnston. (1998). ‘Voter Turnout at the British General Election
of 1992: Rational Choice, Social Standing or Political Eﬃcacy?’ European Journal of
Political Research 33 (3): 249–263.
Pattie, C. J., A. Whitworth and R. J. Johnston. (2015). ‘Does Campaign Contact Inﬂuence
Individuals’ Vote Choices? An Alternative Approach’. European Political Science
14 (3): 279–297.
Riker, W. and P. C. Ordeshook. (1968). ‘A Theory of the Calculus of Voting’. American
Political Science Review 62 (1): 25–42.
Rose, R. and I. McAllister. (1990). Voters Begin to Choose: A Lifetime Learning Model.
London: Sage.
Ross, T. and T. McTague. (2017). Betting the House: The Inside Story of the 2017 Election.
London: Biteback Publishing.
Shipman, T. (2017). Fallout: A Year of Political Mayhem. London: William Collins.
Sniderman, P. M., R. A. Brody and P. E. Tetlock. (1991). Reasoning and Choice:
Explorations in Political Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stiers, D. and Dassonneville, R. (2018). ‘Aﬀect Versus Cognition: Wishful Thinking on
Election Day. An Analysis Using Exit Poll Data from Belgium’. International Journal
of Forecasting, 34 (3): 199–215
Taber, C. S. and M. Lodge. (2006). ‘Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political
Beliefs’. American Journal of Political Science 50 (40): 755–769.
Predicting election outcomes
31
Your short guide to the EUP Journals 
Blog http://euppublishingblog.com/ 
 
A forum for discussions relating to 
Edinburgh University Press Journals 
 
1. The primary goal of the EUP Journals Blog  
To aid discovery of authors, articles, research, multimedia and reviews published in Journals,  and as a 
consequence contribute to increasing traffic, usage and citations of journal content.  
2. Audience 
Blog posts are written for an educated, popular and academic audience within EUP Journals’ publishing fields.  
3. Content criteria - your ideas for posts 
We prioritize posts that will feature highly in search rankings, that are shareable and that will drive readers to 
your article on the EUP site. 
4. Word count, style, and formatting 
 
• Flexible length, however typical posts range 70-600 words. 
• Related images and media files are encouraged. 
• No heavy restrictions to the style or format of the post, but it should best reflect the content and topic 
discussed. 
 
5. Linking policy 
 
• Links to external blogs and websites that are related to the author, subject matter and to EUP publishing 
fields are encouraged, e.g.to related blog posts 
 
6. Submit your post 
Submit to ruth.allison@eup.ed.ac.uk 
If you’d like to be a regular contributor, then we can set you up as an author so you can create, edit, publish, 
and delete your own posts, as well as upload files and images.  
7. Republishing/repurposing 
Posts may be re-used and re-purposed on other websites and blogs, but a minimum 2 week waiting period is 
suggested, and an acknowledgement and link to the original post on the EUP blog is requested.  
8. Items to accompany post 
 
• A short biography (ideally 25 words or less, but up to 40 words) 
• A photo/headshot image of the author(s) if possible.  
• Any relevant, thematic images or accompanying media (podcasts, video, graphics and photographs), 
provided copyright and permission to republish has been obtained.  
• Files should be high resolution and a maximum of 1GB 
• Permitted file types: jpg, jpeg, png, gif, pdf, doc, ppt, odt, pptx, docx, pps, ppsx, xls, xlsx, key, mp3, m4a, 
wav, ogg, zip, ogv, mp4, m4v, mov, wmv, avi, mpg, 3gp, 3g2. 
